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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Eighth Circuit Remands Arkansas Party-Filing
Deadline Case for Lack of Record
Moore v. Martin, No. 15-3558, 2017 WL 1485036 (8th
Cir. 2017).
In a two to one decision, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals remanded a ballot access restriction case back to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas. The case arose after three independent candidates
sought declaratory judgment in response to a 2015 piece of
legislation that moved the 2016 date for non-presidential
candidates running in party primaries from May to March. The
candidates maintained that the new deadline was unnecessarily
early and violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The
district court granted Arkansas’s motion for summary judgment
and one of the candidates, Mark Moore, appealed.
Plaintiff Mark Moore was an independent candidate for
Lieutenant Governor in the 2014 election, who claims on appeal
that he plans to run in 2018. He originally sued the Arkansas
Secretary of State claiming that the March deadline for
independent candidates was not narrowly tailored to serve a
government interest. The district court disagreed, and held that
“Arkansas has a compelling interest in timely certifying
candidates and initiatives to the general election ballot.”
Writing for the majority, Judge Roger L. Wollman held that
a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the new
deadline was narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state
interest. Under the 2015 legislative changes, a person seeking to
run as an independent candidate for any office other than the
President or Vice President must submit the requisite signed
petition. These petitions must be verified by the Arkansas
Secretary of State and county clerks. The majority highlighted
these and a number of other procedural requirements that
candidates must go through before having their names appear on
the general election in November. The opinion also noted that

484

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:483

Arkansas’s ballot access statutes have been repeatedly
challenged, citing cases from 1975, 1976, 1977, 1988, and 1994.
Here, the district court erred “in concluding that there was
no genuine dispute of material fact whether the March 1
deadline is narrowly drawn to serve [a] compelling
interest.” Pointing to the Secretary of State’s evidence of a
higher number of independent candidates who had petitioned for
inclusion, the majority questioned whether this increase in
nonpartisan petitions caused an increase in litigation and
interference with the verification process. The majority
concluded that “the increase in the number of nonpartisan
petitions does not by itself establish the existence of a
compelling interest that the March 1 deadline is narrowly
tailored to serve.” Even if the increase caused Arkansas to hire
more election workers to process the petitions, citing the cost as
a compelling government interest would not likely render the
legislative change constitutional. The United States Supreme
Court has held that the possibility of increased administrative
costs does not justify a statute prohibiting a political party from
opening its primary to voting by independents. The decision
elaborates on gaps in the record regarding timing, feasibility,
and past practices. Without more, the majority concludes, the
lack of record precludes a finding of summary judgment.
Judge Lavenski Smith dissented, faulting the filing deadline
as “neither actually required nor narrowly drawn” and
concluding that Moore was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
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Eighth Circuit Affirms Grant of Summary Judgment in
Lawsuit Against Missouri Police Force Alleging
Excessive Force
Boude v. City of Raymore, No. 16-1183, 2017 WL
1749664 (8th Cir. 2017).
In a unanimous decision, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of
Raymore Police Department.
Plaintiff-Appellee Kimberly
Boude was arrested by Officer Michael Heady after being
physically removed from her motor vehicle in March
2012. After one member of the Raymore Police Department had
found her huffing aerosol spray cans inside her SUV, Officer
Heady was dispatched to respond to a motorist in need of
assistance who matched Boude’s description from the day
before. After Officer Heady approached her car, he spoke with
Boude about turning her car off. When Boude reached for the
gearshift, her car’s brake lights turned on at which point, Officer
Heady said “no, no, no,” reached through the front window, and
turned off the ignition. After taking Boude’s keys, he asked her
to step out of the car. When she refused, he physically removed
her and placed her on the ground before handcuffing
her. Another police officer’s dash camera recorded the events.
After Boude pled guilty to driving while intoxicated, she
claimed injuries from the arrest alleging excessive force,
negligence and battery. The district court granted summary
judgment on the grounds of qualified and official
immunity. Writing for the Court, Judge Duane Benton held it
was objectively reasonable for Officer Heady to (1) believe that
plaintiff’s reach for the gearshift was an attempt to shift the car
to drive and to flee; and (2) believe that the plaintiff’s refusal to
exit her vehicle and subsequent movement was a non-compliant
attempt to possibly flee on foot. On appeal, Boude argued that
Officer Heady’s actions became unreasonable after he had
already taken her keys and eliminated the risk that she might
flee. However, the Court found Heady could have reasonably
believed that she “would continue to be non-compliant or
attempt to flee on foot.” The Court also dismissed Boude’s
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contention that Office Boude forfeited his official immunity by
acting in bad faith. The Court found these conclusory
allegations insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
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Arkansas Supreme Court Affirms Class-Action Status
with Exception of Negligence Claims Against Nursing
Home
Robinson Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC v.
Andrew Phillips, 2017 Ark. 162, 2017 WL 1827824
(unpublished).
In May, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed most of a
circuit court’s order granting class certification in part, allowing
plaintiffs to proceed in a lawsuit against Robinson Nursing and
Rehabilitation Center, LLC, its owner Michael Morton, and
related entities (collectively, “Robinson”). Andrew Phillips
filed the original lawsuit on behalf of his deceased mother,
Dorothy Phillips, and later filed an amended class-action
complaint to include other residents or estates of residents who
resided at the Center from June 11, 2010, to present. Phillips
alleges Robinson’s business practice of chronic understaffing
breached the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA),
constituted negligence and civil conspiracy, and unjustly
enriched Robinson.
Relying on a 2015 Arkansas Supreme Court case, Robinson
argued that class certification was inappropriate. Circuit Court
Judge Timothy Fox found otherwise, concluding that the class
definition was proper and not overbroad. He also identified
twelve issues common to the class members and concluded that
these issues predominated over the individual issues. Further,
Judge Fox found that the class requirements of numerosity,
typicality, superiority, and adequacy were satisfied and granted
class certification. Robinson filed an interlocutory appeal,
arguing that Phillips’s case was fundamentally different from
two previous class action appeals where class certification was
proper. In particular, Robinson maintained that the class
definition was overbroad and that Phillips did not meet his
burden of proving (1) commonality; (2) predominance; (3)
superiority; and (4) typicality under Rule 23 of the Arkansas
Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs class actions and class
certification.
Justice Karen Baker wrote the opinion, agreeing with
Phillips’s contention that the arguments presented by Robinson
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were already rejected by the court. She affirmed the circuit
court’s class certification as Phillips’s breach of contract,
ADTPA, and unjust enrichment claims. Relying on the same
two nursing home class actions, the Court upheld Judge Fox’s
findings of commonality and predominance. As for superiority,
the Court noted that the class was “cohesive and manageable
group because the common question of understaffing can be
ascertained on a classwide basis.” In addressing the typicality
requirement, the Court concurred with Judge Fox, explaining
that “the class representative’s claim arises from the same
alleged wrongful conduct, understaffing.” The Court also
agreed that the class definition was sufficiently definite.
However, Judge Baker disagreed that Phillips’s negligence
claim was appropriate for class certification. Under Arkansas
law, she wrote, “negligence requires an individual analysis of
each plaintiff’s specific allegations.” Further, the law requires
proof that breach of contract was the “proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s injuries” and that “negligence is never assumed.” In
remanding the case, Justice Baker instructed the circuit court to
decertify the class solely on the negligence claim.
Justice John Dan Kemp authored a separate opinion,
concurring and dissenting in part, joined by two other
justices. He faults the majority’s position that the class’s
negligence claim requires an individualized proximate-causation
analysis. This thinking, he explains, involves the majority
“mistakenly delv[ing] into the merits of the underlying
claims.” Justice Josephine Linker Hart, joined by Justice Shawn
Womack, filed an opinion concurring with the reversal on a
class action for negligence, but dissenting on the class
certification for the contract, unjust enrichment and the ADTPA
claims.
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